Operator approach to stochastic games with varying stage duration

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Zero-sum stochastic game

A zero-sum stochastic game Γ is a 5-tuple (Ω, I, J, g, ρ) where:

- Ω is the set of states.
- *I* (resp. *J*) is the action set of Player 1 (resp. Player 2).
- g: I × J × Ω → [−1,1] is the payoff function (that Player 1 maximizes and Player 2 minimizes).
- $\rho: I \times J \times \Omega \rightarrow \Delta(\Omega)$ is the transition probability.

How the Game is played

An initial state ω_1 is given, known by each player. At each stage $k \in \mathbb{N}$:

- the players observe the current state ω_k .
- According to the past history, Player 1 (resp. Player 2) chooses a mixed action x_k in $X = \Delta(I)$ (resp. y_k in $Y = \Delta(J)$). Done independently by each player.
- An action *i_k* of Player 1 (resp. *j_k* of Player 2) is drawn according to his mixed strategy *x_k* (resp. *y_k*).
- This gives the payoff at stage *k*: $g_k = g(i_k, j_k, \omega_k)$.
- A new state ω_{k+1} is drawn according to $\rho(i_k, j_k, \omega_k)$.

For any stochastic game Γ , any finite horizon $n \in \mathbb{N}$, and any starting state ω_1 , the *n*-stage game Γ_n is the zero-sum game with payoff

$$\mathbb{E}\left\{\sum_{k=1}^n g_k\right\},\$$

that Player 1 maximizes and Player 2 minimizes.

The value of $\Gamma_n(\omega_1)$ is denoted by $V_n(\omega_1)$. Normalized value $v_n = \frac{V_n}{n}$.

The discounted game

For any stochastic game Γ , any discount factor $\lambda \in]0,1[$, and any starting state ω_1 , the discounted game $\Gamma_{\lambda}(\omega_1)$ is the zero-sum game with payoff

$$\mathbb{E}\left\{\sum_{k=1}^{+\infty}(1-\lambda)^{k-1}g_k\right\},\,$$

that Player 1 maximizes and Player 2 minimizes.

The value of $\Gamma_{\lambda}(\omega_1)$ is denoted by $W_{\lambda}(\omega_1)$. Normalized value $w_{\lambda} = \lambda v_{\lambda}$.

Recursive structure

Shapley (1953) proved that the values satisfy a recursive structure:

$$V_{n}(\boldsymbol{\omega}) = \sup_{x \in X} \inf_{y \in Y} \left\{ g(x, y, \boldsymbol{\omega}) + E_{\rho(x, y, \boldsymbol{\omega})}(V_{n-1}(\cdot)) \right\}$$

$$= \inf_{y \in Y} \sup_{x \in X} \left\{ g(x, y, \boldsymbol{\omega}) + E_{\rho(x, y, \boldsymbol{\omega})}(V_{n-1}(\cdot)) \right\}$$
$$W_{\lambda}(\boldsymbol{\omega}) = \sup_{x \in X} \inf_{y \in Y} \left\{ g(x, y, \boldsymbol{\omega}) + (1 - \lambda) E_{\rho(x, y, \boldsymbol{\omega})}(W_{\lambda}(\cdot)) \right\}$$

$$= \inf_{y \in Y} \sup_{x \in X} \left\{ g(x, y, \boldsymbol{\omega}) + (1 - \lambda) E_{\rho(x, y, \boldsymbol{\omega})}(W_{\lambda}(\cdot)) \right\}$$

Shapley operator

This can be summarized by:

$$V_n = \Psi(V_{n-1}) = \Psi^n(0)$$

$$W_\lambda = \Psi((1-\lambda)W_\lambda)$$

$$w_\lambda = \lambda \Psi\left(\frac{1-\lambda}{\lambda}w_\lambda\right) = \left(\lambda \Psi\left(\frac{1-\lambda}{\lambda}\cdot\right)\right)^\infty$$

for some operator Ψ .

$$\Psi(f)(\boldsymbol{\omega}) = \sup_{x \in X} \inf_{y \in Y} \left\{ g(x, y, \boldsymbol{\omega}) + E_{\rho(x, y, \boldsymbol{\omega})}(f(\cdot)) \right\}$$

=
$$\inf_{y \in Y} \sup_{x \in X} \left\{ g(x, y, \boldsymbol{\omega}) + E_{\rho(x, y, \boldsymbol{\omega})}(f(\cdot)) \right\}.$$

 $\boldsymbol{\Psi}$ is nonexpansive for the infinite norm

$$\|\Psi(f) - \Psi(f')\|_{\infty} \le \|f - f'\|_{\infty}$$

This was proven by Shapley in the finite case but true in a very wide framework.

For example

- if Ω finite, *X* and *Y* compact, *g* and ρ continuous.
- Ω , *X* and *Y* are compact metric, *g* and ρ continuous.

See Maitra Partasarathy, Nowak, Mertens Sorin Zamir for more general frameworks.

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Definition

- Definition due to Neyman (2013).
- Instead of playing at time 1, 2, ..., n, ..., players play at times t₁, t₂, ..., t_n, ...
- The intensity of both payoff and transition at time t_k is $h_k = t_{k+1} t_k$
- That is $g_h = hg$ and $\rho_h = (1-h)Id + h\rho$.
- Shapley operator of "exact game" with duration h: $\Psi_h = (1-h)Id + h\Psi$

Some natural questions

- What happens, for a fixed horizon *t* or discount factor λ, when the duration h_i of each stage vanishes ? Does the value converge, to which limit ?
- What happens, for a fixed sequence of stage duration *h_i*, when the horizon goes to infinity or the discount factor goes to 0. Does the normalized value converge, to which limit ?
- Solution What happens when both λ (or $\frac{1}{n}$) and h_i go to 0 ?
- What can be said of optimal strategies in games with varying duration ?

Neyman answers questions 1 3 4 for finite discounted games. Here we use the operator approach to give a general answer to 1 2 3.

Finite horizon

Game with finite horizon and varying duration

Finite horizon *t*, finite sequence of stage duration *h*₁, · · · , *h_n* with ∑*h_i* = *t*.
 The value *V* of such a game satisfies *V* = *z_n* with

$$z_{i+1} = \Psi_{h_i}(z_i) = (1 - h_i)z_i + h_i\Psi(z_i)$$

•
$$\frac{z_{i+1}-z_i}{h_i} = -(Id-\Psi)(z_i)$$

- Eulerian scheme associated to $f' = -(Id \Psi)(f)$.
- One can use general results associated to such schemes, for any non expansive operator defined on a Banach space.

Eulerian schemes in Banach spaces

For general nonexpansive Ψ :

Proposition (Miyadera-Oharu '70)

$$||f_{nh}(z_0) - \Psi_h^n(z_0)|| \le ||z_0 - \Psi(z_0)|| h\sqrt{n}.$$

Proposition (V. '10)

If
$$z_{i+1} = (1 - h_i)z_i + h_i \Psi(z_i)$$
, then

$$||f_t(z_0) - x_n|| \le ||z_0 - \Psi(z_0)|| \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^n h_i^2}.$$

with $t = \sum_{i=1}^{n} h_i$.

Result with t fixed

• Let $h = \max h_i$ and $t = \sum h_i$, then

$$\|V-f(t)\| \le K\sqrt{ht}.$$

- Hence as the mesh h goes to 0, the value of the game goes to f(t).
- *f*(*t*) can be interpreted as the value of a game played in continuous time (Neyman '13).

Asymptotic results

• For any h_i ,

$$\left\|\frac{V-f(t)}{t}\right\| \leq \frac{K}{\sqrt{t}}.$$

- All the repeated games with varying stage duration have the same (normalized) asymptotic behavior.
- Same asymptotic behavior for the normalized value in continuous time $\frac{f(t)}{t}$ and for the normalized value of the original game v_n .

Game with discount factor and varying duration

- Discount factor λ = weight on the payoff on [0,1] compared to $[0,+\infty]$.
- Infinite sequence of stage durations h_1, \cdots, h_n, \cdots .
- When *h* is constant, normalized value $w_{\lambda}^{h} = \lambda \Psi_{h} \left(\frac{1-\lambda h}{\lambda} \right)$.
- In general w is

$$\left(\prod_{i=1}^{+\infty} D_{\lambda}^{h_i}\right)(0)$$

with

$$D^h_{\lambda}(f) = \lambda \Psi_h\left(\frac{1-\lambda h}{\lambda}f\right).$$

Result with λ fixed and vanishing duration

- For a uniform duration *h*, $w_{\lambda}^{h} = w_{\mu}$ with $\mu = \frac{\lambda}{1+\lambda-\lambda h}$.
- For any λ and h_i ≤ h, the value w of the λ−discounted game with stage durations h_i satisfies

$$\|w - \hat{w}_{\lambda}\| \le Kh$$

with $\hat{w}_{\lambda} := w_{\frac{\lambda}{1+\lambda}}$.

- Hence as the mesh *h* goes to 0, the value of the game goes to $w_{\frac{\lambda}{1+\lambda}}$. Already known when the game is finite (Neyman 2013).
- *ŵ*_λ can be interpreted as the value of a game played in continuous time (Neyman '13).

Asymptotic results

• Assumption: there exists nondecreasing $k : [0, 1] \to \mathbb{R}^+$ and $\ell : [0, +\infty] \to \mathbb{R}^+$ with $k(\lambda) = o(\sqrt{\lambda})$ as λ goes to 0 and

 $\|D_{\lambda}^{1}(z) - D_{\mu}^{1}(z)\| \le k(|\lambda - \mu|)\ell(\|z\|)$

for all $(\lambda, \mu) \in]0, 1]^2$ and $z \in Z$.

- Always true for Shapley operators of games with bounded payoff.
- Then for any λ and h_i, the value w of the λ-discounted game with stage durations h_i satisfies

 $\|w-w_{\lambda}\|\leq K\lambda.$

- All the repeated games with varying stage duration have the same (normalized) asymptotic behavior as λ goes to 0.
- Same asymptotic behavior for the normalized value in continuous time \hat{w}_{λ} and for the normalized value of the original game w_{λ} .

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Model

- Finite state space.
- P^t(i,j) is a continuous time homogeneous Markov chain on Ω, indexed by ℝ⁺, with generator Q(i,j):

$$\dot{\mathsf{P}}^t(i,j) = \mathsf{P}^t(i,j)Q(i,j).$$

- *G*^h is the discretization with mesh *h* of the game in continuous time *G* where the state variable follows P^t and is controlled by both players (Zachrisson '64, Tanaka Wakuta '77, Guo Hernadez-Lerma '03, Neyman '12)
- Players act at time s = kh by choosing actions (is, js) (at random according to some xs, resp. ys), knowing the current state.
- Between time s and s + h, state ω_t evolves with conditional law P^t

Results

Shapley operator is

$$\overline{\Psi}_h(f) = \underset{X \times Y}{\operatorname{val}} \{ g^h + \mathsf{P}^h \circ f \}$$

where $g^h(\omega_0, x, y)$ stands for $\mathsf{E}[\int_0^h g(\omega_t; x, y)dt]$ and $\mathsf{P}^h(x, y) = \int_{I \times J} \mathsf{P}^h(i, j) x(di) y(dj)$.

- $\|\overline{\Psi}_h(f) \Psi_h(f)\| = (1 + \|f\|)O(h^2)$ where Ψ is the Shapley operator of the (discrete time) stochastic game with payoff g and transition Id + Q.
- Hence all the results of previous section involving small *h* still hold.

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
Conclusion

- We recover and generalize some results of Neyman '13, using only properties of nonexpansive operators.
- Only assumptions are : a) Ψ is well defined and 1-Lipschitz
 b) the current state is observed.
- Same asymptotic structure of original game, games with varying duration, and game in continuous time.
- Counterexamples of convergence of values with observations of states (V., Ziliotto, Sorin V.) are thus also oscillating with varying duration.

Open questions

- What happens with a general weight on the payoff (not finite horizon or constant discount factor) ?
- When *h* goes to 0, results by Neyman (finite games) and Sorin (using viscosity techniques).
- What happens when all the weight goes to infinity (analogous to *t* goes to infinity or λ to 0).
- What if the state is not observed ?


A stupid game



- Only one player
- He observes (and remember) his moves but not the state.
- Starting state ω.
- Clearly w_λ tends to 1 as λ goes to 0

Conclusion and remarks

A (not so) stupid game with varying stage duration.



 As long as Player 1 plays change the probability of being in the first state satisfies

 $p_{t+1} = (1-h)p_t + h(1-p_t) = (1-2h)p_t + h.$

• Hence $h \leq \frac{1}{2}$, w_{λ}^{h} tends to $\frac{1}{2}$ as λ goes to 0. In fact $w_{\lambda}^{h} \leq \frac{1}{2}$ for any $h \leq \frac{1}{2}$.

Conclusion and remarks

Thank you for your attention

Thank you !

G.Vigeral (with S. Sorin) Operator approach