

Computability theory and uncountable structures

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What phenomena occur across every generic extension

Global behavior tends to be independent of the generic: if \mathbb{P} is reasonably homogeneous, then the theory of $V[G]$ does not depend on G .

On the other hand, individual sets in generic extensions must vary wildly:

Theorem (Solovay)

Suppose G_0, G_1 are two mutually generics. Then $V[G_0] \cap V[G_1] = V$.

Proof. Take $\nu[G_0] \in (V[G_0] \cap V[G_1]) - V$ of minimal rank.

Then $\nu[G_0] \subset V$.

If $\nu[G_0] = \mu[G_1]$, then this is forced by some $(p, q) \in \mathbb{P}^2$.

The set $\{x \in V : \exists r \leq p(r \Vdash x \in \nu)\}$ is in V , and must equal $\nu[G_0]$. \square

Generically presentable structures

Solovay: if a set is in every generic extension by some forcing, it exists already.

Definition

A *generically presentable structure up to* \cong is a pair (ν, \mathbb{P}) such that

$$\Vdash_{\mathbb{P}} \text{“}\nu \text{ is a structure with domain } \omega\text{”} \quad \text{and} \quad \Vdash_{\mathbb{P}^2} \text{“}\nu[G_0] \cong \nu[G_1]\text{”}.$$

A *copy* of (ν, \mathbb{P}) is a $\mathcal{A} \in V$ with $\Vdash_{\mathbb{P}} \text{“}\mathcal{A} \cong \nu\text{”}$. (Maybe $\text{dom}(\mathcal{A}) \neq \omega$.)

Recently and independently introduced by Kaplan and Shelah.

Question

If (ν, \mathbb{P}) is a generically presentable structure, what hypotheses ensure that it has a copy in V ?

Looking at the forcing: positive results

Looking at the forcing: positive results

Theorem (Knight, Montalbán, S.)

- 1 If \mathcal{A} is generically presentable by a forcing not making ω_2 countable, then \mathcal{A} has a copy in V ;
- 2 If \mathcal{A} is generically presentable by a forcing not making ω_1 countable, then that copy is countable.

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Independently proved by Kaplan and Shelah.

Proof. For (1), the age of the Morleyization of \mathcal{A} lives in V ; by Delhomme-Pouzet-Sagi-Sauer, Fraïssé limits of ages of size \aleph_1 exist. For (2), Scott sentence is in $\mathcal{L}_{\omega_1\omega}^V$ since $\omega_1^V = \omega_1^{V[G]}$, and existence of countable models is absolute. \square

Counterexamples to Vaught's conjecture

Corollary (Harrington)

Any counterexample to Vaught's conjecture has models of size \aleph_1 with Scott rank arbitrarily high below ω_2 .

Independently by Larson, and by Baldwin/S.
Friedman/Koerwien/Laskowski.

Proof. Given $\alpha < \omega_2$, collapse ω_1 to ω , get $B \models T$ with $sr(B) > \alpha$. If B not generically presentable, can get perfect set of such models. So B is generically presentable, hence has a copy in V since ω_2^V is still uncountable. \square

Remark

Hjorth showed that counterexamples need not have models of size \aleph_2 .

Looking at the structure: positive results

Theorem (Knight, Montalbán, S.)

If \mathcal{A} is generically presentable and rigid (no nontrivial automorphisms), then \mathcal{A} has a copy in V .

Independently by Paul Larson.

Proof uses amalgamation argument — unique way to amalgamate is even better than lots of ways to amalgamate. Given $p \in \mathbb{P}$ presenting \mathcal{A} , look at portion \mathcal{A}_p of structure built by p ; can glue these together in unique way, so inside V . \square

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Theorem (Zapletal, unpublished)

Generically presentable trees have copies.

Kaplan-Shelah, following Zapletal: study when generically presentable linear orders, models of superstable theories, already exist.

Looking at the forcing: negative results

Looking at the forcing: negative results

Theorem (Knight, Montalbán, S.)

If forcing with \mathbb{P} makes ω_2 countable, then there is a structure \mathcal{A} , generically presentable by \mathbb{P} , which has no copy in the ground model.

Looking at the forcing: negative results

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Independently by Kaplan-Shelah

Uses construction of Laskowski and Shelah, and later Hjorth: theory with predicate U and no atomic models if $|U| = \aleph_2$, but countable atomic model in which U is set of indiscernibles. In generic extension, we can attach $(\omega_2, <)$ to indiscernibles of this model; resulting structure has a copy after making ω_2 countable but has no copy in ground model.

Aside: generically presentable cardinalities

Definition

A *generically presentable cardinality* is a pair (ν, \mathbb{P}) where ν is a \mathbb{P} -name and $\Vdash_{\mathbb{P} \times \mathbb{P}} \nu[G_0] \equiv \nu[G_1]$. (ν, \mathbb{P}) has no copy in V if for no $A \in V$ do we have $\Vdash_{\mathbb{P}} A \equiv \nu$.

Question

Is it consistent with ZF that there are generically presentable cardinalities with no copies?

Note that forcing over ZF-models can add new cardinalities (Ex: Truss ????)

Question (Zapletal)

Is it consistent with ZF that there is a generically presentable cardinality (ν, \mathbb{P}) with no copy in V , such that ν is a name for a set of reals?

- 1 Generically presentable structures
- 2 **Computability in generic extensions**
- 3 Versions of the reals

Classical computable structure theory

We study the complexity of a structure by looking at its *copies*: for a countable structure \mathcal{S} , a *copy* of \mathcal{S} is a structure S with domain ω isomorphic to \mathcal{S} .

Throughout, structures have finite signature.

If \mathcal{A} is a countable structure, a *copy* of \mathcal{A} is a structure which is isomorphic to \mathcal{A} and has domain ω ; we identify copies with the reals coding them.

Definition (Muchnik reducibility)

If \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B} are structures, \mathcal{A} is *Muchnik reducible to* \mathcal{B} if (nonuniformly) every copy of \mathcal{B} computes a copy of \mathcal{A} ; we write $\mathcal{A} \leq_w \mathcal{B}$.

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- \mathcal{A} is computably presentable $\implies \mathcal{A} \leq_w \mathcal{B}$
- For $X \subseteq \mathcal{A}$ finite, the substructure generated by X is $\leq_w \mathcal{A}$
- $\mathcal{L}, \mathcal{L}_0, \mathcal{L}_1$ linear orders $\implies \mathcal{L} \leq_w \mathcal{L}_0 + \mathbf{1} + \mathcal{L} + \mathbf{1} + \mathcal{L}_1$
- If $\mathcal{L} \prec \hat{\mathcal{L}}$ are linear orders, need not have $\mathcal{L} \leq_w \hat{\mathcal{L}}$ (Harrison order)

Uncountable computable structure theory

For \mathcal{A} uncountable, \mathcal{A} has no copies whatsoever, so \leq_w is not useful.

There are many ways one might generalize computability structure theory to uncountable settings.

Today: want notion which agrees with \leq_w on countable structures, and is generally not contingent on set-theoretic axioms.

Uncountable computable structure theory

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Today: want notion which agrees with \leq_w on countable structures, and is generally not contingent on set-theoretic axioms.

We ask, “what would the complexity of \mathcal{A} be **if \mathcal{A} were countable?**”

Definition (Generic Muchnik reducibility (S.))

For \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B} structures of arbitrary cardinality, we write $\mathcal{A} \leq_w^* \mathcal{B}$ if $\mathcal{A} \leq_w \mathcal{B}$ in every generic extension of the universe in which both are countable.

Can similarly study other computability-theoretic reductions between uncountable structures

Absoluteness

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Theorem (Shoenfield Absoluteness)

If φ is Π_2^1 with parameters from \mathbb{R} , we have:

$$V[G] \models \varphi \iff V \models \varphi.$$

Corollary

- We can replace “every generic extension” by “some generic extension” in definition of generic Muchnik reducibility.
- For \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B} countable, $\mathcal{A} \leq_w^* \mathcal{B} \iff \mathcal{A} \leq_w \mathcal{B}$.

Back to generic presentability

Theorem (Knight, Montalbán, S.)

If \mathcal{A} is generically presentable, and is generically Muchnik reducible to a structure $\mathcal{B} \in V$ with $|\mathcal{B}| \leq \aleph_1$, then \mathcal{A} has a copy in V .

Proof.

In $V[G]$ with $\omega = |\omega_1^V| < |\omega_2^V|$, let $B \cong \mathcal{B}$ with domain ω .

Let $V[G][H]$ be further extension in which \mathcal{A} has a copy.

$\exists e$ such that $V[G][H] \models \text{“}\Phi_e^B \cong \mathcal{A}\text{”}$.

In $V[G]$, Φ_e^B satisfies Scott sentence of \mathcal{A} .

Existence of countable models of $\mathcal{L}_{\omega_1\omega}$ -sentences is absolute.

So \mathcal{A} has a copy in $V[G]$, and hence in V .

Proposition (Knight, Montalban, S.)

Counterexample to “Shoenfield for structures” is $\leq_w^ (\omega_2, <)$.*

Proof. Theory of Laskowski-Shelah has computable atomic model. \square

Some examples, I/III: Real and complex numbers

Consider the following uncountable structures:

$$\mathcal{C} = (\mathbb{C}; +, \times), \quad \mathcal{W} = (\omega, \mathcal{P}(\omega); Succ, \in), \quad \mathcal{R} = (\mathbb{R}; +, \times)$$

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Observation

\mathcal{C} is “generically computably presentable:” \mathcal{C} has a computable copy in every generic extension in which it is countable.

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Every countable structure is generically Muchnik reducible to \mathcal{W} and to \mathcal{R} .

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Observation

Every countable structure is generically Muchnik reducible to \mathcal{W} and to \mathcal{R} .

Theorem (Igusa, Knight)

\mathcal{W} is strictly less complicated than \mathcal{R} : $\mathcal{W} <_w^* \mathcal{R}$.

Independently by Downey, Greenberg, J. Miller (unpublished).

Some examples, II/III: ω_1

Some examples, II/III: ω_1

Proposition

For \mathcal{A} countable:

$$\mathcal{A} \leq_w^* (\omega_1, <) \iff \exists \text{ countable ordinal } \alpha \text{ with } \mathcal{A} \leq_w^* (\alpha, <).$$

Proof. Suppose $\mathcal{A} \leq_w^* (\omega_1, <)$. Let $V[G]$ be generic extension in which ω_1 is countable. Then we have

$$V[G] \models \text{“}\mathcal{A} \leq_w (\alpha, <) \text{ for some countable ordinal } \alpha\text{.”}$$

This is a Σ_2^1 sentence with a real parameter (since \mathcal{A} is countable), so already true in V . \square

Question

What families of countable structures are captured by some single uncountable structure?

Some examples, III/III: ω_1 and \mathbb{R}

Proposition (Richter)

If a real X is computable in every copy of a linear order \mathcal{L} , then X is computable.

Corollary

$(\omega_1, <) \not\leq_w^* \mathcal{W}$.

Proposition (Ash, Knight)

If X' computes a copy of a linear order \mathcal{L} , then X computes a copy of $\omega \cdot \mathcal{L}$.

Corollary

$(\omega_1, <) <_w^* \mathcal{W}$.

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Versions of the reals

$$\mathcal{W} = (\omega \sqcup 2^\omega; Succ, \in), \quad \mathcal{B} = (\omega \sqcup \omega^\omega; Succ, \circ)$$

$$\mathcal{R} = (\mathbb{R}; +, \times)$$

\mathcal{R}^* = ω_1 -saturated real closed field realizing all types in V

$$\mathcal{R}_f = (\mathbb{R}; +, \times, f), \quad \mathcal{R}^+ = (\mathbb{R}; +)$$

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There seem to be two levels of complexity:

$$\mathcal{W} \equiv_w^* \mathcal{B} <_w^* \mathcal{R}^+ \equiv_w^* \mathcal{R} \equiv_w^* \mathcal{R}_f \quad (f \text{ analytic})$$

Simple reductions

Proposition (Igusa, Knight)

$$\mathcal{R}^* \geq_w^* \mathcal{B} \geq_w^* \mathcal{W}.$$

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$$\mathcal{W} \equiv_w^* \mathcal{R}^*.$$

Simple reductions

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$$\mathcal{W} \equiv_w^* \mathcal{R}^*.$$

Theorem (Macintyre-Marker)

If S is a Scott set and $T \in S$ is a consistent theory, any enumeration of S computes the complete diagram of a recursively saturated model of T realizing exactly the types in S .

Proof of Prop. After collapse, \mathcal{W} is still a Scott set, and each ground real — including $Th(\mathcal{R})$ — appears in \mathcal{W} ; apply Macintyre-Marker. \square

$$\mathcal{R}^* <^*_w \mathcal{R}, I/II$$

Definition

If K is a real closed field:

- K is *Archimedean* if every element of K is below some $q \in \mathbb{Q}$.
- The *residue field* $Res(K)$ of K be the quotient of the finite elements by the infinitesimal elements.
- A *residue field section* of K is a subfield of K isomorphic to $Res(K)$.
- $FT(K)$ (“finite transcendental”) is the set of finite elements not infinitesimally close to an algebraic element.

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Lemma

If K is a real closed field with domain ω , then:

- If $Res(K)$ has a $\Sigma_2^0(K)$ copy, then $FT(K)$ is $\Sigma_2^0(K)$. . .
- . . . And so K has a residue field section which is $\Sigma_2^0(K)$.

$$\mathcal{R}^* <_w^* \mathcal{R}, \text{ II/II}$$

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Theorem (Igusa, Knight)

- (Reduction) If $\text{Res}(K) \leq_w^* K$, then $\text{FT}(K)$ is Σ_2^c -definable in K .
- (Undefinability) If K is a recursively saturated real closed field, the set $\text{FT}(K)$ is not Σ_2^c -definable in K .

Since “recursively saturated” is absolute, this gives:

Theorem (Igusa, Knight.)

$$\mathcal{R}^* <_w^* \mathcal{R}.$$

Expansions of \mathcal{R} , I/II

What happens if we add expressive power to \mathbb{R} ?

Definition

A function $f: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is *trivial* if, in any $V[G]$ where \mathbb{R} is countable, we have: Any copy \mathcal{A} of $\mathcal{R} = (\mathbb{R}^V; +, \times)$ with domain ω computes a copy \mathcal{B} of $\mathcal{R}_f = (\mathbb{R}^V; +, \times, f)$ with $\mathcal{B} \upharpoonright \{+, \times\} = \mathcal{A}$.

This is stronger than $\mathcal{R} \equiv_w^* \mathcal{R}_f$.

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This is stronger than $\mathcal{R} \equiv_w^* \mathcal{R}_f$.

Proposition

A function f is trivial iff it is piecewise algebraic.

Proof. Right-to-left is immediate. For left-to-right, build (in $V[G]$) a sufficiently generic copy of $\mathcal{R} = (\mathbb{R}; +, \times)$ by forcing with $\mathcal{R}^{<\omega}$. Can diagonalize against Φ_e unless “ $f(x) = y$ ” determined by finitely many $\{+, \times\}$ -atomic formulas. \square

Interlude: O -minimality and bases

Definition

An ordered structure \mathcal{A} is *o -minimal* if every definable subset of \mathcal{A} is a union of finitely many intervals.

Theorem (Macintyre)

The structure $\mathcal{R}_{exp} = (\mathbb{R}; +, \times, exp)$ is o -minimal

Definition

A *basis* for \mathcal{R}_{exp} is a set $U \subset \mathbb{R}$ such that

- Every real is definable over some tuple from U .
- No element of U is definable over any disjoint tuple from U .

A tuple is *independent* if it can be extended to a basis.

Expansions of \mathcal{R} , II/II

Definition

We let $IND_n(\mathcal{R}_{exp})$ be the set of independent n -tuples of \mathbb{R} .

Lemma

The sets $IND_n(\mathcal{R}_{exp})$ of independent n -tuples are $\Delta_2^{c, Th(\mathcal{R}_{exp})}$ in any copy of \mathcal{R} .

Proof. \bar{a} is independent iff there is an assignment of open boxes around \bar{a} to formulas such that the formula holds of \bar{a} iff it holds in whole box. \square

Theorem (Igusa, Knight, S.)

\mathcal{R}_{exp} is generically Muchnik equivalent to \mathcal{R} .

Proof. We use lemma to get Δ_2^0 -approximation to a basis for \mathcal{R}_f , and build the “term” model generated by this basis. \square

Since $|\mathbb{R}^{\mathbb{R}}| > \mathbb{R}$, there are functions in V which add information.

Question

Is there a “reasonably definable” f which adds information?

Question

Is there a continuous function f adds information?

Conjecture (Igusa, Knight, S.)

Martin-Lof Brownian motion adds information.

Further versions of the reals

Theorem (Igusa, Knight, S.)

$\mathcal{R}_f \equiv_w^* \mathcal{R}$ for f analytic.

Uses Wilkie: \mathcal{R} adjoined with analytic functions on compact intervals is ω -minimal.

Theorem (Igusa, Knight, S.)

The field $(\mathbb{R}; +, \times)$ is generically Muchnik reducible to the group $(\mathbb{R}; +)$.

Theorem (Igusa, Knight, S.)

For $\langle a_i : i \in \omega \rangle \in \mathbb{R}^\omega$, the expansion $(\mathbb{R}; +, \times, a_0, a_1, \dots)$ is generically Muchnik reducible to \mathcal{R} .

Proof. In each case, we show that the independence relation over the larger language is Σ_2^c in the smaller language.

Thanks!

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