Institute for Mathematical Sciences Event Archive

Dynamic Models in Economics

(4 - 22 Jun 2018 & 2 Jul - 3 Aug 2018)

  • Yi-Chun Chen (National University of Singapore)
  • Yeneng Sun (National University of Singapore)

  • Wei He (The Chinese University of Hong Kong)
  • Jingfeng Lu (National University of Singapore)
  • Xiao Luo (National University of Singapore)
  • Xiang Sun (Wuhan University)
  • Yifei Sun (University of International Business and Economics)
  • Satoru Takahashi (National University of Singapore)
  • Junjie Zhou (National University of Singapore)

  • General Enquiries: ims(AT)
    Scientific Aspects Enquiries: ynsun(AT)

    In real life situations, most decisions are made in a dynamic context in the sense that multi-period decisions influence the final outcomes. The games of "chess" and "go" are simple examples. The main aim of this program is to study game theory, mechanism design and matching in a dynamic context. First, for dynamic games with complete or incomplete information, while much is known for the case of finitely many actions, extensions to the case with infinite actions or with uncertainty are often considerably more difficult and some of them remain unsolved. Second, as a sort of reverse game theory, mechanism design aims to design particular games to achieve efficient outcomes or to maximize the revenues. A typical example is auction. To consider mechanism design in dynamic environments, novel tools beyond those used in the static problems need to be developed. Third, matching theory describes the formation of mutually beneficial relationships such as trading partnership, job placement and marriage. The evolution of such relationships over time plays an important role in various models and much remains to be explored.

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