Uncertainty and Information in Economics
(9 May - 3 July 2005)

Organizing Committee ·  Confirmed Visitors · Overview · Activities · Membership Application

Co-chairs

• Robert Anderson (University of California at Berkeley)
• Parkash Chander (National University of Singapore)
• Peter Hammond (Stanford University)
• Yeneng Sun (National University of Singapore)

Members

• Krzysztof Apt (National University of Singapore)
• Joseph Halpern (Cornell University)
• Xing Jin (National University of Singapore)
• Ali Khan (Johns Hopkins University)
• Nicholas Yannelis (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)

• Partial List; as at 25 May 2005

Researchers in economic theory have long recognized the importance of uncertainty and information, but major advances have been made during the last two to three decades especially. The program will focus on three areas of microeconomics where uncertainty and information play a key role: game theory, information economics, and finance.

Game theory and information economics have become virtually inseparable since the 1970s. The program will focus on games of both complete and incomplete information. Auction theory represents one of the most prominent applications of games of incomplete information, with bidders’ private information as the main factor affecting their strategic behavior. We plan to provide an overview of the recent developments in the theory of auctions, including combinatorial auctions developed by computer scientists. Another branch of game theory that will be covered is the theory of coalition formation. This has achieved renewed prominence in recent years, with more emphasis being placed on understanding when economic agents have an incentive to form a coalition, rather than how a group of economic agents should share the benefits of forming a coalition.

The program will also consider equilibrium theory with differential information from both the cooperative and non-cooperative points of view. Incentive compatibility problems and mechanism design will be a focus of study. We will also consider work in computer science on both automated and algorithmic mechanism design.

Another focus of the program will be the interplay between equilibrium theory and asset pricing, with particular emphasis on incomplete markets. In complete markets, complex financial securities can be synthetically replicated by sophisticated trading strategies involving considerably simpler instruments. In incomplete markets, this is not usually possible. Nevertheless, in some cases the pricing of complex securities can still be accomplished via equilibrium arguments.

Schedule of Workshops, Tutorials, Seminars and Conference

• 16 May 2005, 30 May - 3 Jun 2005, 6 - 12 Jun 2005, 13 - 17 Jun 2005
   

Workshops

• Workshop on Economic Theory, 16 May 2005
• Workshop on Uncertainty and Information in Economics, 6 - 10 Jun 2005

Tutorials

• Game theory by Sudhir Shah, University of Delhi, 30 - 31 May 2005
   - Lecture notes: PDF...
• The theory of coalition formation by Parkash Chander, National University of Singapore, 1 - 2 Jun 2005
• Asset pricing in dynamic, discrete time, general equilibrium models by Felix Kubler, Universitaet Mannheim, 3 Jun 2005
   - Lecture notes: PDF...   Presentation slides: 1) PDF..., 2) PDF..., 3) PDF..., 4) PDF...
• Computational mechanism design and auctions by David Parkes, Harvard University, 13 Jun 2005
   - Presentation slides: PDF...
• Differential information economies by Nicholas Yannelis, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 14 Jun 2005
   - Lecture notes: PDF...
• Financial contracts and the theory of debt by Anne Villamil, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 15 Jun 2005
   - Lecture notes: 1) PDF... 2) PDF...
• General equilibrium foundations of continuous-time finance by Robert Anderson, University of California at Berkeley, 16 - 17 Jun 2005
   - Lecture notes: PDF...

Conference

• The Tenth Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, 10 - 12 Jun 2005
  *Jointly organized with the School of Computing, NUS
   - Conference Activities...

School lectures

• Reviving the language used to invent the calculus by Peter Loeb, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 19 May 2005
  *Jointly organized with Victoria Junior College
• Better for you, worse for me? (meaning of "Optimality" for groups of people) by Walter Trockel, Bielefeld University, 27 May 2005
  *Jointly organized with Raffles Junior College

Colloquium lecture

• Minimal rationality by Isaac Levi, Columbia University, 6 Jun 2005, 02:00pm - 04:00pm
  *Jointly organized with Department of Philosophy, NUS
  Venue: Philosophy Resource Room, AS3 #05-23

There will be seminars and research interactions through out the program, in addition to above activities.

IMS Membership is not required for participation in above activities. For attendance at these activities, please complete the registration form (MSWord|PDF|PS) and fax it to us at (65) 6873 8292 or email it to us at ims@nus.edu.sg.

If you are an IMS member or are applying for IMS membership, you do not need to register for these activities.

The Institute for Mathematical Sciences invites applications for membership for participation in the above program. Limited funds to cover travel and living expenses are available to young scientists. Applications should be received at least three (3) months before the commencement of membership. Application form is available in (MSWord|PDF|PS) format for download.

More information is available by writing to:

Secretary
Institute for Mathematical Sciences
National University of Singapore
3 Prince George's Park
Singapore 118402
Republic of Singapore

or email to imssec@nus.edu.sg.

For enquiries on scientific aspects of the program, please email Yeneng Sun at matsuny@nus.edu.sg.

Organizing Committee ·  Confirmed Visitors · Overview · Activities · Membership Application